Abstract-Role-based access control (RBAC) has been adopted successfully by a variety of security system by reducing the complexity of the management of access control. The least privilege principle is a very important constraint policy of RBAC. Devising a complete and correct set of roles for supporting the least privilege principle has been recognized as one of the most important tasks in implementing RBAC. A key problem is how to find such sets of roles which have the least permissions. In fact, when the number of role-permission assignments is large, it is almost impossible to find a rigorous set of roles which has the completely same set of permissions required by a user. To address this problem, we research the problem how to find such the rigorous combinations obeying the principle of least permissions. By bringing forward the concept of the least privilege mining problem, we describe the methods to resolve the problem and some instances of its applications, too. Moreover, the corresponding algorithms are displayed. Specially, by analyzing the complexity of least privilege mining problem, the method based on evolutionary algorithm is shown appreciate. Correspondingly, the experiments are accomplished to prove our opinions. Finally, the paper is concluded and some future work is posed.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that the principle of least privilege is a design principle to which access control models and systems should adhere. In role-based access control (RBAC), roles represent organizational agents that perform certain job functions within the organization. Users, in turn, are assigned appropriate roles based on their qualifications [1] [2] [3] . One of the major tasks in implementing RBAC is to enforce the principle of least privilege by managing role assignments.
Principle of least privilege means that in a computing environment, every module (such as a process, a user or a program on the basis of the layer we are considering) must be able to access only such information and resources that are necessary for its legitimate purpose [4, 5] . However, when there is great number of permissions and roles, it is very troublesome to find an appropriate set of roles that owns a minimal set of permissions. In fact, when the number of both roles and permissions are large, it is almost impossible to find a completely accurate set of roles which has the completely same set of permissions required by a user. Therefore, an important problem is how to find such combinations and which combination has the least permissions? In other words, which role set is the most rigorous for application of RBAC? We call it LPMP (Least Privilege Mining Problem).
To explore this problem, we consider several LPMPs including the basic LPMP ant the approximate LPMP which can formally define the least privilege mining problem in RBAC. We also introduce some methods to resolve these problems. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the RBAC model and some preliminary definitions employed in the paper. In section 3, some related researches are introduced. In section 4, we define our basic least privilege mining problem as well as its variations, followed by section 5 in which we explore the algorithms to address these problems. The experiments based on the algorithms are displayed in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes our work and provides some insight into our ongoing and future research.
II. RELATED WORK
A number of approaches have been proposed in the literature to accomplish the task of ensuring the least privilege principle in access control system. Timothy E. Levin etc. extends the separation kernel abstraction to represent the enforcement of the principle of least privilege [6] . Levin introduces an approach that supports an orthogonal, finer-grained flow control policy by extending the granularity of protected elements to subjects and resources. In fact, this is just an access control solution.
For RBAC, the least privilege principle can be enforced by multiple ways. An important strategy is constraints [1, 2] in RBAC, which is implemented by separation of duty (SoD). SoD can be static or dynamic, that has been described in [7, 8] .The next generation of RBAC will be dynamic activation and revocation of roles [9] . The detailed mechanism of dynamic activation and revocation of sessions is given in [10] . The separation of Manuscript received March 25, 2011; accepted September 7, 2011. duty is implemented to avoid one man control. By dynamic SoD, the least privilege principle is enforced indirectly [11] .
Besides, Muhammad Asif Habib has described the complexities and complications which can be faced after implementing separation of duty in terms of mutually exclusive roles (MER) [12] . According to the point of Habib, both mutual exclusion and role inheritance will affect least privilege. Liang Chen etc. defines a family of a simple roles-based models that provide support multiple hierarchies and temporal constraints [13] . By this means, the inter-domain role mapping (IDRM) problem is brought forward. Then, it is implemented to investigate least privilege and the IDRM problem in the presence of multiple role hierarchies and temporal constraints.
All these researches are helpful for our work. They provide some interesting ideas for our research on the least privilege problem.
Last but not least, it must be mentioned that our work benefits from the research of Jaideep Vaidya in [14] greatly. The content of Vaidya's paper is to define the role mining problem (RMP) for discovering an optimal set of roles from existing user permissions in RBAC. In fact, its main field is role engineering [15] but not least privilege. But the methods of defining problems of this paper provide an important reference for our work. We introduce the basic LPMP, δ-Approx LPMP and MinNoise LPMP that do formally root in the definitions of the basic RMP, δ-approx RMP and the Minimal Noise RMP. The main relation between our work and Vaidya's is that the same formalized methods are applied into the different sides of RBAC.
III. PRELIMINARIES
We adopt the NIST standard of the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict ourselves to RBAC0 without sessions, role hierarchies or separation of duties constraints in this paper.
RBAC Model [1, 2]  U, ROLES,OPS, and OBJ are the set of users, roles, operations and objects.  UAUROLES, a n-to-n mapping user-to-role assignment relation.  PRMS (the set of permissions) {(op, obj)|opOPS  objOBJ}.  PAPRMS×ROLES, a n-to-n mapping of permission-to-role assignments.  UPAU×PRMS, a n-to-n mapping of user-topermission assignments.  assigned_users(r)={uU| (u,r) For two relation sets X, Y, and their relation matrixes
means that UPM should be within δ of the user-permission matrix generated from URM and RPM. When δ=0, a user will obtain not only all permissions which he requires, but also none of permissions which he does not require. δ-Consistency binds the degree of difference between UA, PA, and UPA. Now, based on these preliminaries, we will formalize the least privilege mining problem: how to find a minimum set of roles which contains all essential permissions with minimum redundancy.
IV. LEAST PRIVILEGE MINING PROBLEM

A. Basic LPMP
Giver a user u, there may be a corresponding set of permissions expressed as required_permissions (u) . In order to implement this relation, u must be mapped onto a corresponding set of roles expressed as assigned_user -(u) where assigned_user -is the inverse function of assigned_user. Therefore, the basic LPMP for u asks us to find a user-to-role assignment UA such that UA and the role-to-permission assignment PA can exactly describe the user-to-permission assignment UPA while excluding any redundant permission. Put another way, LPMP require us to find an optimum combination of roles for user to follow the least privilege principle.
LPMP can be described formally as shown in Figure 1 . Figure 1 shows a process: Given a set of permissions PRMS, a set of roles ROLES, a role-to-permissions assignment PA, a user-to-permissions assignment UPA, and a user u, find a user-to-role assignment UA for user u, with M(UA)M(PA) being 0-Consistency by M(UPA). For an application system equipped with RBAC, roles are steadier than users. When a user needs to access the system, he will always hope for all permissions what he wants. However, there may be any combination of roles including the same permissions exactly. For example, supposed that there are 10 roles for 1000 permissions, a user requests 120 permissions. Which roles should be assigned to this user? There are 2 10 -1 possible combinations of roles, that should contain more than one combination which covers all of the 120 permissions only if its any role is not be eliminated.
Therefore it could hardly be accomplished to find an exact match with 0-consistency at most time.
B. A Typical Eaxmples
The basic LPMP provides us an important reference for researching the least privilege mining problem. But it is not appreciate for most real instances. For illuminating this point, in this section, we introduced several typical examples to discuss
In Figure 2 , we have 30 permissions and 6 roles. Now a user needs 10 permissions. Obviously, the circumstance of Fig.2 is very troublesome. Its relations can be displayed:
Roles' assignment: -assigned_permissions(r1)= {p2,p3,…,p9,p15}; -assigned_permissions(r2)= {p2,p3,…,p6,p12,p30}; -assigned_permissions(r3)= {p20,p21,…,p28 }; -assigned_permissions(r4) = {p1,p9,p10,…p17,p19}; -assigned_permissions(r5) = {p2,p3,p16,p17,…,p21}; -assigned_permissions(r6)= {p1,p2,p29}; -assigned_permissions(r7)= { p2,p3…,p16,p29};
User' assignments: -case 1: required_permissions(u) = {p1,p2,…,p9,p15,p29};
In this case, user will need role r1 and r6 which will exactly match the permissions required by user. In other word, there exists a 0-consistency assignment for case 1.
-case 2: required_permissions(u) = {p2,p3,…,p6,p9,p15}; In this case, both {r1} and {r1,r2} will contain the permissions, but none is 0-consistency. {r1} is 3-consistency; {r1,r2} is 5-consistency.
- As a matter of fact, sometime we will find there is not any 0-consistency assignment thoroughly because of the original architecture of an RBAC system. For a simple example:
-PRMS = { p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6}; -assigned_permissions(r1) = {p1, p2, p4, p6}; -assigned_permissions(r2) = {p1, p2, p5, p6}; -assigned_permissions(r3) = {p2, p3, p5}; -required_permissions(u) = {p1, p3, p5 } It can be seen that there does not exist any set of roles matching user's request exactly but 3 approximate sets {r1,r3}, {r2,r3} and {r1,r2,r3}. Further, we can find that {r2,r3} is the best one with 2-consistency redundancy only. {r2,r3} will be the most appropriate redistribution for security administrator.
LPMP:
Conditions:
So, we can see that it is very hard to find an exact match for LPMP. Furthermore, if permissions are assignment to roles at random, it is almost impossible to find an exact 0-consistency match for user's permissions [14] . If we allow approximate matching -i.e. if it is good enough to match all permissions required by user besides some redundant permissions. As long as we make the redundant permissions few enough, we might consider that we have found the least permissions combination. This significantly reduces the burden of maintenance on the security administrator while generating only a few redundant permissions which may be shielded specially. As a matter of fact, sometime we will find there is not any 0-consistency assignment thoroughly because of the original architecture of an RBAC system. So we should consider the approximate LPMP. Approximate match might be a prudent choice for an RBAC system with dynamic user-permission assignments.
C. Approximate LPMPs
In this section, we introduce two approximate LPMPs: δ-Approx LPMP and MinNoise LPMP Obviously, the basic LPMP is simply a special case of the δ-Approx LPMP with δ=0 and no minimizing the number of roles. The reason of restricting the number of roles is that there may be more than one combination of roles with δ-Consistency but we prefer to the one with least roles. The merit of minimizing the number of roles is that less roles would be convenient for the predistribution for security administrator.
Definition 1 (δ-Approx LPMP).
Given a set of permissions PRMS, a set of roles ROLES, a role-to-permissions assignment PA, a user-topermissions assignment UPA, and a user u, find a userto-role assignment UA for user u, with M(UA)M(PA) being δ-Consistency by M(UPA) and minimizing the number of roles.
δ-Approx LPMP brings a more flexible method for security administrator if only restrict the value of δ. However, sometimes user mainly cares the least permissions but not the least roles for stricter security principle. Consequently, instead of bounding the approximation, and minimizing the number of roles, it might be interesting to do the reverse: bound the number of roles, and minimize the approximation. We call this the Minimal Noise Least Privilege Mining Problem (MinNoise LPMP). The security administrator might want to do this when he is looking for the top-k roles that can contain the problem space well enough, and are still robust to noise. Actually, MinNoise LPMP and δ-Approx LPMP are important complementarities of two sides of LPMP. 
Definition 2 (MinNoise LPMP). Given a set of permissions PRMS, a set of roles ROLES, a role-to-
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D. Application of LPMPs
For an RBAC application, actually, different initializations will correspond to different solutions for LPMP. If you are fortunate enough, maybe a basic LPMP (0-approx LPMP) would take effect, otherwise you must select δ-Approx LPMP or MinNoise LPMP. In order to clarify these problems further by means of an example, we will discuss several cases by Table III that shows a sample user-permission assignment (UP matrix: M(UPA)) with 3 users and 5 permissions.
Firstly, Table I (b) shows an ideal user-role assignment (UR matrix: M(UA)) by which a rolepermission assignment (RP matrix: M(PA)) in Table I (a) can completely describe the given user-permission assignment (M(UA)M(PA)=M(UPA)) for all of three users. Table II(b) . In this case, both u2 and u3 have still user-role assignments that can completely describe the given user-permission assignment, but u1 could only get a 1-consistent assignment. It must be mentioned that {r1,r3} is also a 1-consistent assignment for u1, but it is eliminated because of redundant roles.
Lastly, Tables III(a) and 6(b) show the optimal userrole assignment and role-permission assignment for MinNoise LPMP with k=2.
V. EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHM FOR LPMPS
We have had the formal definitions of the least privilege mining problem. But we have not the corresponding formal algorithms still. In fact, the algorithm to address LPMP is very important.
In the former examples, we can straightly calculate the appreciate assignments for a user without any algorithm, since there are a few of roles and permissions. However, when there are a great number of roles and permissions, it is almost impossible to calculate straightly. Given a case with an accurate number of roles and permissions, there will be a great deal of probability about how to assign roles to user. Only those combinations that can cover the request of user are appropriate.
A. Traditional Algorithm
When both m and n are finite number, 2 n -1 and k must be finite, too. So we can design two simple algorithms by searching all of combinations.
As long as computation environment is good enough, the final correct combination will must be found. We call such algorithms ordinary LPMP algorithms (OLAs).
We have defined three formal least privilege mining problems: the basic LPMP, δ-Approx LPMP and MinNoise LPMP. Since the basic LPMP is simply a special case of the δ-Approx LPMP with δ=0 and no minimizing the number of roles, we need only two algorithms for δ-Approx LPMP and MinNoise LPMP. Figure 5 shows an algorithm for δ-Approx LPMP, called ALPMP. Figure 6 shows an algorithm for MinNoise LPMP, called MLPMP.
The key steps of ALPMP are:
1. Line 1-4: Some conditions. 2. Line 5-6. Some initialization operations are performed. S is initialized as ROLES for maximizing |S|, because we need pick out a minimal set. 3. Line 8-16. Find all appreciate sets of roles for u.
All subsets of ROLES are traversed. 4. Line 18-24. Pick out the minimal set of roles from all appreciate sets found in step 2. 
B. Complexity of LPMP
The mechanisms of OLA are very simple. But its complexity needs to be considered much. OLS need search the whole space of solutions of LPMP, so its efficiency is not so satisfying.
Given a case with an accurate number of roles and permissions, there will be a great deal of probability about how to assign roles to user. When n roles hold m permissions averagely, there are 2 n -1 combinations of roles. Clearly, when n is very large, such approaches are computationally heavy, since searching and computing 2 n combinations will take an exponential time in the number of roles.
In fact, all LPMPs are optimization problems. It can be proved that all LPMPs are NP-complete.
First, we select a basic NP-complete problem: Definition 3 (SBP: Set Basis Problem) [14] . Given a collection C of subsets of a finite set S, and a positive integer K ≤|C|, is there a collection B of subsets of S with |B| = K such that, for each c  C, there is a subcollection of B whose union is exactly c?
This problem has been proved NP-complete [14] . For the basic LPMP, S demotes the assignments of role-permission. C denotes user-permission assignments. Every set c  C stands for one user u. Therefore, LPMP can be mapped to the SBP directly by polynomial transformation. By this way, LPMP can be proved NPcompletes [16] , too.
The basic LPMP is NP-complete, and the approximate LPMPs are the variations of the basic LPMP. We have seen that not only δ-Approx LPMP but also MinNoise LPMP does not change the real matter of the basic LPMP. In fact, he approximate LPMPs are more common than the basic LPMP. So the approximate LPMPs should be NP-complete [14, 16] .
About how to detail the complexity of LPMP, this would go beyond the scope of this paper. We will further research this problem in our future work.
We have known LPMP is NP-complete. OLA algorithm is an immediate way to address LPMP, so OLA is NP-hard, too. Now our task is to construct a simple substitute algorithm to solve this NP-hard problem.
C. Evolutionary LPMP Algorithm (ELA)
In order to constructing a simple substitute algorithm to solve the NP-complete LPMP, we bring forward an method based on evolutionary algorithm [17, 18] . Evolutionary algorithm can perform well approximating solutions to all types of problems because they ideally do not make any assumption about the underlying fitness landscape; this generality is shown by successes in fields as diverse as engineering, art, biology, economics, marketing, genetics, operations research, robotics, social sciences, physics, politics and chemistry.
An EA uses some mechanisms inspired by biological evolution: reproduction, mutation, recombination, and selection. Candidate solutions to the optimization problem play the role of individuals in a population, and the fitness function determines the environment within which the solutions "live". Evolution of the population then takes place after the repeated application of the above operators. We introduce an evolutionary LPMP algorithm (ELA) to resolve our problems. In ELA, each combination of roles is look upon as a chromosome. By through a series of operations such as selection, crossover and mutation, some more excellent chromosomes are generated recursively, until the termination conditions are triggered.
Evolutionary algorithm can be used to resolve many actual problems. Due to limited space, we only introduce a simple algorithm, called MELA that adapts to MinNoise LPMP. In fact, minimal noise problem is very general in the actual applications [6] , not only the basic LPMP but also the δ-Approx LPMP can be resolved with ELA on basis of MELA.
Algorithm MELA is displayed in Figure 7 . Its key steps are:
1 In most of real applications of EAs, computational complexity is a prohibiting factor. In fact, this computational complexity is due to fitness function evaluation. Fitness approximation is one of the solutions to overcome this difficulty. However, seemingly simple EA can solve often complex problems; therefore, there may be no direct link between algorithm complexity and problem complexity.
In our MELA, there is a fitness function named Objective at line 22 in Figure 7 . Algorithm Objective is displayed in Figure 8 . Its key steps are: 
VI. EXPERIMENTS
We have the ordinary LPMP algorithm (OLA) and the evolutionary LPMP algorithm (ELA). In this section, we will compare the two kinds of algorithms by some experiments.
For simply displaying our experiments, we introduced several abbreviations about experimental parameters: -NoR: the number of roles, corresponding to the constrained number of roles -k in MinNoise LPMP. Our experiments are performed on a DELL PC (2GHz Intel Core Duo, 2GB 667MHz DDR2 SDRAM).
Besides, in our experiments, the number of permissions is 3000 and the set of permissions required by user is generated at random each time. But both OLA and ELA use just the same condition parameters each time. In this experiment, both OLA and ELA are implemented by using MATLAB 7.0. The results of OLA and ELA are displayed in Table V and Table VI respectively. There are 10 groups of tests with the number of roles being not more than 15; there are 6 groups with 16 roles, 3 groups with 20 roles. There is 1 group test with 300 roles for ELA only, since it could hardly be accomplished by using OLA for too many roles. In this experiment, both OLA and ELA are implemented by using C++. The results of OLA and ELA are displayed in Table VII and Table VIII respectively. Because C++ is more efficient than Matlab, we can perform more tests in this experiment. But for NP-hard OLA, when there are too many roles, it is still too hard to accomplish. We do 20 groups of tests with no more than 15 roles; 15 groups with 16 roles, 6 groups with 20 roles. We perform 10 group tests with 300 roles for ELA only but not for OLA.
A. Experiment by Matlab
Experiment by C++
C. Analysis of Experimrnts
From the experimental results we can conclude: 1. With not only Matlab but also C++, when the number of roles is small, OLA is more efficient than ELA. But when the number of roles exceeds 11, ELA is clearly more efficient than OLA. Furthermore, along with the increase of roles, ELA's superiority is more and more obvious. 2. ELA owns better robustness than OLA. When there 20 roles, ELA still needs only 4~6 seconds, but OLA needs more than 90000 seconds for Matlab or 16000 seconds for C++. Even in the face of 300 roles, ELA can still finish the test in limited time. For OLA, however, we can not accomplish the test on our PC at all, with using not only easy Matlab but also efficient C++. 3. The relative error of OLA is exact, which can reach to the theoretic minimum. Correspondingly, the results of ELA are rough a bit, which have been marked with "↑" in Table VI and VIII. But this is tolerable relative to its efficiency. From  Fig.9 , we can see this point, too. It can be concluded that when need to assign a few roles, OLA is more efficient, and otherwise, ELA is a more appreciate substitute.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have formally defined the least privilege mining problem (LPMP) for RBAC. Besides the basic LPMP, we define the approximate LPMPs including not only δ-Approx LPMP but also MinNoise LPMP. It has been mentioned that the basic LPMP is a special case of δ-Approx LPMP. Both δ-Approx LPMP and MinNoise LPMP are useful in the real RBAC applications. The former emphasizes the scale of roles but the latter emphasizes the minimal redundancy of permissions, while they all provide the least privilege principle for applications. Some material cases are discussed to clarify these problems further. The algorithms are displayed simply in order to clarify how to resolve LPMP.
The main contributions of this paper is to provide a material aim for research the least privilege principle of RBAC by mapping this problem to some formal definitions in mathematics. But there is some insufficiency that is our future work.
1. For simplify the work, we restrict ourselves to RBAC0. However the standard RBAC is more complicated. We need to consider the standardization and application of LPMP in the complete RBAC.
